

**Forgetting the Soviet Union, but ‘loving’ China.
Albania’s foreign policy on 1960**

**Forgetting the Soviet Union, but ‘loving’ China;
Albania’s foreign policy in 1960.**

Abstract: The year 1960 was very tense for the Albanian foreign policy. The communist regime in the country was facing the dilemma of staying “loyal” to the Soviet Union, or abandoning the “unbreakable” alliance with Moscow and aligning with China. The huge ideological and nationalist clash between the two communist giant countries, was not passing unobserved by Enver Hoxha. Indeed, he had begun to nourish doubts on the Soviet Union since the famous secret speech of Khrushchev in February 1956 and the rapprochement of the latter with Yugoslavia, the supposed archenemy of Albania. The People’s Republic of Albania had received numerous credits and loans from the socialist camp countries. The Soviet Union was Albania’s main creditor and had granted credits and loans to the country since 1947.

In the People’s Republic of China, Enver Hoxha saw the right replacement of the Soviet “benefactor” when time would come to split from Moscow’s tutorship. It was crucial to Enver Hoxha to receive as much credits and loans as he could to maintain his absolute power in the country. Albania’s economy was facing serious crises during the second half of the 1950s. The clash between China and the Soviet Union was like a rescue boat for Enver Hoxha’s power. The Albanian leader could not let escape this chance of abandoning the alliance with the Soviet Union and promptly aligning with China.

This paper is mainly based on primary archival sources some of which are presented for the first time to the readers. The author tries to carry out a thorough analysis of the ending period of the “honeymoon” between the Soviet Union and Albania and the alignment of the latter with the People’s Republic of China.

Keywords: Albania, Soviet Union, China, communism, ideology, economy.

The meeting of Bucharest and Enver Hoxha's stand

On 6 June 1960, in Tirana was hold an urgent meeting of the Partia e Punës e Shqipërisë/Party of Labor of Albania [hereinafter: PLA] Politbureau about the information that has sent the Soviet ambassador in Tirana on summoning a meeting of all the communist parties of the socialist camp.¹ In this meeting, Enver Hoxha has made fait accompli Albania's participation in the meeting of Bucharest and the entire Politbureau completely approved the positive reply that theirs and country's leader has given to the Soviet ambassador in Albania.² About the tense international situation, Enver Hoxha ordered to be highly kept in the party and people the vigilance to always unmask as much as was possible imperialism and revisionism.³

In this meeting, Enver Hoxha seized the opportunity to criticize Gogo Nushi and Liri Belishova which were at official visit in China. Hoxha had especially explicitly demanded to Belishovës and Haxhi Lleshi that was with her there, to prepare ardent speeches about the great love that Albania had for the Soviet Union.⁴ Also, they had to warmly speak on the People's Republic of China [hereinafter: PRC], her successes, and in no way to not put in evidence the Sino-Soviet divergences.⁵ Enver Hoxha ordered that in the present international moments, the steel unity of the socialist camp countries and the question of peace sought the strengthening of the lines around the Soviet Union within Marxism-Leninism doctrine.⁶

The sharpest problem that the Politbureau faced, was what kind of stand should be kept in Bucharest if the Soviets openly clashed with the Chinese. Hoxha himself thought that Albania should remain silent about the divergences between these two great communist powers, while Spiro Koleka thought that should be kept a stand because Liri Belishova informed from China that the divergence between Beijing and Moscow should become known in the Central Committee of the PLA.⁷ After a short reflection, also Enver Hoxha agreed to be given a reply from the part of Albania about this divergence.⁸ For Albania, to give a reply, was necessary in Hoxha's opinion that the Chinese should come at the meeting in Bucharest

1 *National Central Archive, Tirana, Republic of Albania* [hereinafter: *AQSH*], Fund [hereinafter: f. 14/Organet Udhëheqëse/Leading Bodies [hereinafter: OU], Year [hereinafter: Y.] 1960, File [hereinafter: F.] 14, p. 1. Minutes of the meeting of the Politbureau on 6.6.1960.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid, p. 3.

5 Ibid, p. 4.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid, p. 5.

8 Ibid.

and for the moment Albania should stand by the side of the Soviet Union.⁹

On 22 June 1960, PLA's Central Committee Politbureau kept another meeting with the inscription "Top secret" about the information that has sent its envoy in the meeting of Bucharest, Hysni Kapo.¹⁰ After the information sent by him, Enver Hoxha said in the meeting that the disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party were not fair, not good and not in the Marxist-Leninist way.¹¹ Moreover on the Sino-Soviet debates, Enver Hoxha in this meeting emphasized Liri Belishova's mistake after the meeting with China's president, Liu Shaoqi, which then she went to talk with the Soviet adviser in Beijing.¹²

According to the information sent by Hysni Kapo who was in Bucharest, the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov provoked the Albanian delegation by saying: "What's Albania doing? Only Albania does not agree!"¹³ Apparently, the Soviet Union sought a strong block of all the socialist camp countries against China. In this big clash between the two giant communist countries, Enver Hoxha has "found" who to blame [Belishova] to sacrifice her as pro Soviet and the first who supported without reserves the chairman against her was Spiro Koleka by saying:

"This matter is like comrade Enver says, that all these have to do with the Soviet Union and with China, therefore before going to the Soviet comrades, the comrades that were in China should had first take our advice. With the Soviet Union we have nothing to hide, but there are moments when first you have to inform your party".¹⁴

Beqir Balluku also didn't miss the chance to support "the commander" by saying that Gogo and Liri have had put the Politbureau in a very difficult position.¹⁵ Watching that his name was mentioned, Gogo Nushi present in this meeting, stood up saying that for the divergences between the Soviet Union and China he had no knowledge.¹⁶ However, Enver Hoxha interrupted him by saying that even when he was absent in the meetings when all these things were being discussed, nobody obstructed him to consult the minutes

9 Ibid, p. 6.

10 AQSH, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 16, p. 1. Minutes of the protocol about the PLA's Politbureau meeting on 22/6/1960.

11 Ibid, p. 2.

12 Ibid, p. 3.

13 Ibid, p. 6.

14 Ibid, p. 7.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid, p. 8.

of the Politbureau or Secretariat meetings.¹⁷ Beqir Balluku, surprisingly, stood pro Gogo Nushi, but against Liri Belishova saying:

*“You [Gogo] was not present in that meeting where comrade Enver has spoken, but Liri was present. It’s obvious that all these have been confused from the conversation that has been made with the Soviet Ambassador in China “.*¹⁸

Was obvious that the fate of Liri Belishova and that of her husband Maço Çomo was sealed. Why? The cause was a conversation of 6 June 1960, where during five hours of negotiations with Liu Shaoqi, whom after being expelled from the party six years later would be nicknamed “the Chinese Khrushchev”,¹⁹ was spoken on Sino-Soviet disagreements. From this meeting, the Albanian delegation was shocked.²⁰ Liri Belishova said that she had no authorization to discuss on these issues, but encouraged the parts to achieve an agreement and not to put in danger the unity, because the Soviet Union and China were the greatest socialist countries, the hope for all the communists and peoples.²¹ At the reception given from the Albanian embassy in Beijing on 6 June 1960 in honor of the Albanian parliamentary delegation, Liri Belishova took advantage from the occasion and through the Albanian ambassador in Beijing, Mihal Prifti, requested a meeting with the representatives of the Soviet embassy in China. In the meeting came the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Beijing. From the Albanian side were present Liri Belishova and Gogo Nushi. Belishova told to the Soviet diplomat what had she talked with the Chinese.²² The Soviet diplomat promised that would inform his superiors what had heard from her, thanked her and left. In that moment the meeting was over.²³

After receiving the information on the meeting from Belishova and Nushi, but especially from Hysni Kapo in Bucharest, Enver Hoxha, writes to Liri on 28 June 1960, where he abruptly instructed her:

“I shall give you only one advice: Every word had to be properly measured

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Serge Bernstein & Pierre Milza, *Histoire du monde de 1900 á nos jours; du XX^e au XXI^e siècle*, Paris: Hatier, 2018, p. 402.

20 Ana Lalaj, “China: The last ally of communist Albania. New Insight from Albanian Archives”, in *New Sources, New Findings: The Relationships between China, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe*, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences forum, Beijing, 2013, p. 332.

21 Ibid, op. cit.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

from you and less words, the better is".²⁴

For the moment, Enver Hoxha was not taking any precaution. He simply was waiting how would be the outcome of "the battle" Moscow-Beijing in Bucharest. The challenge in front of which was standing the Albanian dictator was great and was directly connected with his political existence and not only. Two weeks later, on 8 July 1960, a letter with the inscription "Secret", Enver Hoxha informed all the Politbureau and the Central Committee members that on 11 July would take place the special meeting of Central Committee Plenum for some information issues.²⁵ In the report presented by Hysni Kapo in this meeting that lasted two days (11-12 July 1960),²⁶ he informed with details the stand that has kept the official delegation of the PLA in the meeting of Bucharest.

In this meeting according to the report presented by Hysni Kapo, was violated the Moscow Declaration from the part of the Soviet Communist Party.²⁷ The language used in the discussions was rude and reckless and the stand of the Chinese delegation was qualified as dogmatic personally from Nikita Khrushchev and they [the Chinese] were against the peaceful coexistence.²⁸ After the direct accusation that Khrushchev issued, the chairman of the Chinese delegation, Pen Chen, raised his voice saying that here the debate was out of the Soviet informing letter of 7 June, and was under accusation China's communist party.²⁹ The distributed material from the Soviet delegation in this meeting according the Chinese delegation was head over heels calumny and the disagreements between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were greater and were based on four main points.³⁰ Also, China was accused from Khrushchev in the Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party as ideologue of the Cold War within the socialist camp.³¹

Nikita Khrushchev (who was the last to speak) in his speech have said

24 *AQSH*, f. 14/Marrëdhëniet me Partinë Komuniste të Kinës/Relations with the Chinese Communist Party [hereinafter: MPKK], Y. 1960, F. 2, pp. 43-44. On the complete correspondence between Enver Hoxha and Liri Belishova, see Gjon Boriçi, *Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-kineze në Luftën e Ftohtë, 1956-1978*, Tiranë: MIRGEERALB, 2016, pp. 98-99 & Gjon Boriçi, Gjon Boriçi, *Shqipëria dhe Kina; marrëdhënie e ngushtë në sfondin e Luftës së Ftohtë, Dokumente 1956-1978*, Tiranë: ASA, 2020, pp. 102-105.

25 *AQSH*, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 2, p. 1. Information from Hysni Kapo after participating in the meeting of Bucharest, 24-26 June 1960.

26 *Ibid*, p. 2, 3.

27 *Ibid*, p. 8.

28 *Ibid*.

29 *Ibid*, p. 10.

30 *Ibid*, p. 11, 12.

31 *Ibid*, p. 12.

that had dissatisfaction in the stand kept from the PLA especially when its official delegation with direct orientation from Tirana have said that this conflict was between two parties and this meeting was premature.³² During his speech, Khrushchev emphasized that the situation in the Soviet Union was far better than the period of Stalin when artillery was ready for every eventuality.³³

This last phrase was too much for Enver Hoxha. Same as Stalin, he also maintained power with the artillery ready and the violent dictatorship installed in the country had no other way that could be maintained. Destalinization process initiated in the XX congress, was present and also very visible in the meeting of Bucharest. A dictatorial system has necessary to keep the tension even in a fiction way for continuing to exists. The delivered tension towards society keeps such power because “the guilt” is elsewhere addressed, the leadership is always right. China in this period was still under the shocking waves of the Great Leap Forward and this generation of tension against the people, Khrushchev according to Hysni Kapo have said to the face of Pen Chen.³⁴ Also according to Khrushchev, the passing from capitalism to socialism didn’t required return to Stalinism, as the Chinese did in their critic to the XX Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party. The Soviet leader went as far as to say to the Chinese delegation: “If you love so much Stalin, we can exhume him and you can take it and keep him in Beijing”.³⁵

Enver Hoxha admitted in the meeting that about Soviet-Chinese divergences together with Mehmet Shehu, were previously informed by Mikoyan since February 1960.³⁶ According to Hoxha, Khrushchev called strange the stand of the Albanian delegation in Bucharest not aligning with all other parties to condemn China.³⁷ Enver Hoxha forcefully emphasized

32 Ibid, p. 13.

33 Ibid, p. 13-14.

34 Ibid, p. 14.

35 Ibid, p. 15. “Stalin annihilated the pick of the party and the entire Central Committee of the 17 Congress and all the chain of command of our army. I continuously receive letters from the kolkhoz people, where they say that it would have been better if Stalin would have died 10 years ago. When you speak about Stalin, perhaps you want to weaken my position in the Central Committee and to amputate my legs? You are mistaken Chinese comrades. We advise you to not hope on the dead horse “.

36 Ibid, p. 36. Part from Enver Hoxha’s speech: “Mikoyan told us, Albanian comrades, I shall inform you on the disagreements we have with the Chinese Communist Party. We have decided these information to share only with the first secretaries, therefore we beg comrade Mehmet Shehu not take it for granted, not because we don’t trust him, but it is so decided. No, said Mehmet, I’ll go out, it was a mistake that I have come, but after, Mikoyan said he could stay. Then he told us all what you have heard about “.

37 Ibid, p. 37.

that Albania never would do such a thing to oust China from the camp.³⁸ In the Soviet-Yugoslav debate of 12 years ago, Albania had accepted without having the slightest hesitation to align herself at the side of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia and to support without reserves every Soviet policy. In the concrete case, the Soviet Union has not “convinced” the Albanian leadership on the righteousness of its stand against China.³⁹ The destalinization spirit that Khrushchev was seeking by all the communist and labor parties didn’t walked side by side with the personal policy of Enver Hoxha. The Albanian communist leader also spoke at the meeting about the disagreements he had with Khrushchev on Panajot Plaku, Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega stating that the Soviet leader has told him that has been a mistake killing them.⁴⁰

At the end of the meeting of 12 July 1960, Enver Hoxha said that the case of Liri Belishova should be reviewed by the Politbureau and she herself should reflect on this matter.⁴¹ The clash Soviet Union-China has produced the first “scapegoat” in Albania. Other punishments would be given until the end of 1961 on the so-called “pro Soviets” in every cell of Albania’s power and society.

The stand of PLA’s Politbureau on the withdrawal of the Soviet advisers from China

The Bucharest meeting left a bitter taste for the Albanian leadership. Meanwhile, many things had to be clarified and the relations between the Soviet Union and China were at the center of the politics in Albania. In the period June-July 1960, the Politbureau meetings with the inscription “Top secret” or “Secret” were day order. On 25 July 1960, Central Committee’s Politbureau of the Party of Labor of Albania had another meeting.⁴² Among the hot potatoes discussed in this meeting, were the project-plan on completing the budget for the first semester of 1960, the project-plan

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid, p. 43. “Khrushchev said that we have make a mistake for killing Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega, who was pregnant. Such a thing eve tsar has not committed. We replied with coldblooded, comrade Khrushchev we don’t kill for fun, we put a bullet only to those who betray the country and the people and after has been proved so that have committed hostile actions and have filled the cup. These people our party has condemned for years, they are traitors and Tito’s agents and only when they wanted to escape we have put our hands on them, in bases of facts and we did well to kill them. According to what you said that Liri Gega was pregnant, this is a slander”.

41 Ibid, p. 173.

42 *AQSH*, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 19, p. 153. Secret. Minutes of the Party of Labor of Albania Politbureau’s Central Committee meeting, on 25 July 1960.

on agriculture for 1961, the information on the stand of the Albanian delegation in the future meeting of the Albanian-Yugoslav commission on the aquatic economy etc.⁴³ However, what interests us the most are the point 9 and 11 of the meeting.

In the Polish capital Warsaw, at the Albanian embassy has occurred an incident. In the meeting of the Politbureau meeting of 11-12 July 1960, among other things, Enver Hoxha has straighten out the Warsaw incident.⁴⁴ On the occasion of 29 November celebration, on 1959, an unknown person in the Polish capital attempted to steal the documents of the Albanian ambassador.⁴⁵ That person, as Hoxha said, to lose the traces has only taken the film "Scanderbeg" and tried to burn the building where the Albanian embassy resides.⁴⁶ The Polish authorities have made possible his arrest after Albania's protests and by prosecutor pretence was required his condemnation with 12 years of prison, while the court according to Hoxha condemned him only with 6 months with condition.⁴⁷

The Polish government through her ambassador in Tirana, even after two other notes sent from the Albanian government, didn't apologized according to Hysni Kapo.⁴⁸ According to Kapo, the Polish government didn't accepted the Albanian stand by accusing Albania without any based charges.⁴⁹ Not only, but the Polish ambassador when came to know about the content of the Albanian note, refused to take it because had the same content as the first note.⁵⁰

The fact that mostly preoccupied Albania was beyond any doubt another one. Following Hysni Kapo's report, an important place occupies without doubt point 11 where is informed the Central Committee on the withdrawal of the Soviet advisers from the People's Republic of China. According to an informing letter arrived in the PLA's Central Committee from the Soviet ambassador in Albania, Ivanov, Khrushchev ordered the return home of 1.500 Soviet specialists from China.⁵¹ This withdrawal was justified because according to the Soviets, such a request has been previously made by the Chinese, because the Soviets have made propaganda there about the

43 Ibid.

44 *AQSH*, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 2, p. 47. On Warsaw's incident.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 *AQSH*, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 19, p. 191. Information of the comrade Hysni Kapo about the stand of the Polish ambassador in Tirana towards the second note of our government on Warsaw incident.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid, p. 192.

51 Ibid.

mistakes committed by the Soviet Union.⁵² Moreover, the information from the Soviet ambassador, contained Khrushchev's accusation that the Soviets were worked out from the Chinese.⁵³ Albanians felt mitigated about the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet relations because on this matter those [the Soviets] didn't required a reply from the Albanian leadership.⁵⁴

The exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet relations was meaningful not only for Albania, but for the West also. Just taking power at end of the first half of the '50ies after Stalin's death and during all the second half of this decade, Nikita Khrushchev sent thousands of specialists in the PRC. During all the '50ies, all these specialists have played a key role in all the links of the Chinese administrations.⁵⁵

According the Soviet model, China also should apply the Five Year Plan on education.⁵⁶ The stroke who gave life to the breach of Sino-Soviet relations, was beyond any doubt the XX Congress of the Soviet Union's Communist party and the secret speech that Khrushchev kept there against Stalin. The complete withdrawal of the Soviet specialists from China by Khrushchev order, in my opinion was the first action that convinced Enver Hoxha after the Bucharest meeting starting to abandon "the unbreakable and eternal friendship" with the Soviet Union and to associate with China. However, the moment to do so has not yet arrived.

Secret information on PLA's stand about Soviet-Chinese divergences

The sharp problems seen during the Bucharest meeting between the Soviet Union and the PRC, certainly would be analyzed in "details" from the Albanian communist leadership. In an informing letter with the inscription "Top Secret" of 23 June 1960 personally signed by Enver Hoxha, PLA's Politbureau informed all the districts first secretaries on Soviet-Chinese divergences.⁵⁷ The aim of this top secret information according to Politbureau, was to inform in order to be in the same line with the Politbureau all the districts first secretaries on the Bucharest meeting events. The aim was that for any kind of surprise, the base organizations of the party should walk the same step as the Politbureau. The sent information expressed the concern on the danger menacing the socialist camp and the international revolutionary movement from the divergences

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid, p. 193.

55 Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War; a world history*, St Ives: Allen Lane, 2017, p. 238.

56 Ibid, p. 239.

57 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 5, p. 1. Personal. Top Secret. To the district's Party First Secretary. 23.6.1960.

of the two biggest communist parties of the world.⁵⁸ To inform the base, the information expressed with big letters that the PLA would always faithfully follow the right Marxist-Leninist principles.⁵⁹ The greatest concern written in this document was about the fact the enemies would try to exploit the situation from this disagreement by causing ideological and political confusion in order to divide the unity of the socialist camp and to denigrate and discredit the Soviet Union and the PRC.⁶⁰

Because this matter had a high sensitivity for the security of the communist regime itself in Albania, the Politbureau “instructed” the first secretaries of districts that for every information that they might hear on the radio or press about Soviet-Chinese divergences, they immediately had to inform the party in order to get the necessary “explanations”.⁶¹ The only line that should be so far protected, was that of Moscow Declaration in 1957.⁶² The letter signed and seal from Enver Hoxha was sent to the 30 first secretaries of the districts within the same date.⁶³

Because the PLA’s stand was rightly understood and 100% supported, on 30 September 1960, Enver Hoxha through a letter “instructed” Ramiz Alia to work with the Albanian embassies abroad to pay the right attention when were informed from the Albanian students and to verify the source of the information about the Soviet-Chinese situation.⁶⁴ The letter sent to the Albanian embassies abroad from Enver Hoxha, with the script “Top Secret”, was on the same spirit with the letter sent to the districts about the Soviet-Chinese divergences and the PLA stand in Bucharest.⁶⁵ The Albanian ambassadors should keep according to him a strong stand and to inform the Albanian students and all the communists living abroad in details.⁶⁶ In a word, the Albanian embassies should be “the voice” of transmitting the PLA stand in the international arena about the Soviet-Chinese clash!

Was very clear that the concept revisionism for Enver Hoxha had to do about leadership change. The thing is that, as long as he lived, he would have never allowed it[revisionism]. Every Albanian communist should have been convinced according to Hoxha on the threat of revisionism,

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid, p. 2.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid, p. 4. Note: Plenum’s comrades have been informed by phone to come in the Central Committee’s apparatus to read the letter nr. 35. date 23.VI.1960.

64 AQSH, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 504, p. 1. Information sent to Enver Hoxha on the Soviet-Chinese rift.

65 Ibid, p. 2-4.

66 Ibid, p. 4.

especially the Yugoslav.⁶⁷ Still the time had not come to openly speak against Khrushchev's revisionism nonetheless the severity of the latter contradictions with China. Khrushchev orientation given during the Bucharest meeting was not the right one according to Hoxha.⁶⁸

After receiving Enver Hoxha's letter, all the Albanian diplomats starting from the ambassador Nesti Nase in Moscow, started to give "assurances" on their socialist purity fully supporting the PLA's stand.⁶⁹ The ambassador Nase, because was in the country who had deflected in "revisionism" was informing with chirurgical precision even on third hand information from the meetings he had even with not important people in Moscow.⁷⁰ The info sent from the ambassador Nase in Moscow until the end of October 1960, are so many and in most of the cases so irrelevant, but all have in front a note from Enver Hoxha, meaning that the leader read them all carefully. The communist purity and the absolute devotion to the PLA line (that was his line) it should not even have been imagined to be questioned.

The information sent from the ambassador Nase had not few parts where the party was informed on the Soviet stands towards the Chinese. According to the Soviets, the ambassador informed, the Chinese were stubborn and didn't accept their mistakes.⁷¹ Also, the situation of the Soviet advisers in China was unbearable and they have left the country because the Chinese didn't accepted anymore their advices.⁷² Important to Enver Hoxha was the fact that from the Albanian embassies in the socialist camp, should be taken as much as possible information about the Soviet-Chinese divergences and especially on China. From such a report coming from Budapest, during a meeting that the Albanian ambassador there, Edip Çuçi, had with the chargé d'affaires of the Soviet embassy B.S. Popov, the latter have said that the Chinese communists couldn't be compared with the Yugoslavs because they build socialism, while the Yugoslavs worked on Americans' money.⁷³ Perhaps, this has been a provocation from the part of Popov so much more when the ambassador Çuçi informed that the Soviet diplomat firstly mentioned Mehmet Shehu rather than Enver Hoxha.⁷⁴

67 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 505, p. 44/1. Is sent comrade Enver letter "On some foreign behaviors that ruin people's conscience".

68 *Ibid*, p. 50.

69 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 580, p. 1-3. Letter of Nesti Nase addressed to Hysni Kapo. Moscow, 3 August 1960.

70 *Ibid*, p. 12. Moscow, 4 September 1960.

71 *Ibid*, p. 44.

72 *Ibid*.

73 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 634, p. 12. Information from the Albanian embassy in Budapest. 24.8.1960.

74 *Ibid*. Part from the information of the ambassador Edip Çuçi: "During the conversation

Was clear that Enver Hoxha couldn't trust the Soviets anymore. This fact is confirmed from another document. In another information from the ambassador Çuçi in Budapest on 11 September 1960, the first secretary of the Bulgarian embassy Pavlov, informed the Albanian ambassador about the meeting he had with the adviser of the Yugoslav embassy Dimitrijević.⁷⁵ According to the Bulgarian diplomat, the Yugoslav had said to him that between Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu occurred a quarrel from which could derive a lot of hostilities.⁷⁶

Indeed, between Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, on September 1953 happened a very strong clash from which Shehu survived only from the Soviet ambassador intervention,⁷⁷ but on 1960, the papers show us that was no conflict between Hoxha and Shehu. Also, about this information coming from Budapest, the papers do not inform if Enver Hoxha had started doubting again on Mehmet Shehu.

The information Enver Hoxha was receiving from his ambassadors accredited in the socialist camp, should have been combined with the information he had received from the country he was interested more in this moment, China. The Albanian ambassador in the PRC, Mihal Prifti, informed the center through a secret telegram that the image of China in the international situation in the countries fighting against colonization was good.⁷⁸ According the other information coming from Beijing in the beginning of 1960, PRC was often visited from high officials of the socialist camp countries, where mostly catches the eye the Germans and their big investments there.⁷⁹

The information that made Enver Hoxha to strengthen his conviction that the Sino-Soviet divergence could go further, was that of 23 August 1960, when the trade adviser of the Bulgarian embassy, Ivan Pavlov, have said that Pen Chen on behalf of the Chinese delegation in Bucharest, has not accepted that Khrushchev spoke on behalf of all.⁸⁰ This fact, showed that

was three times in a row mentioned comrade Enver and comrade Mehmet. In this occasion, we saw that Popov firstly mentioned comrade Mehmet rather than comrade Enver nonetheless from our side was always firstly mentioned comrade Enver”.

75 Ibid, p. 34.

76 Ibid. Part of the ambassador Çuçi information: “Pavlov told me that comrade Enver as intellectual represents the small intelligentsia and bourgeoisie and is capable to win over comrade Mehmet nevertheless the latter is a revolutionary and represents the working class. I, said Pavlov, told to Dimitrijević that comrade Enver has been to Bulgaria and he is a respected friend of the Bulgarian people, son of the Albanian people and distinguished in his activity for the international communist movement “.

77 Gjon Boriçi, “Pohimi nga Byroja Politike e PPSH...”, op. cit, p. 205.

78 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 668, p. 3. Information from Beijing on 26 January 1960.

79 Ibid, p. 7.

80 Ibid, p. 17.

the Chinese Communist Party had achieved a kind of independence from the influence of the Soviet Union's Communist Party. In the information of 7 November 1960, the responsible on the foreign journalists of "People's Daily", Chen Zhui Cin, had declared that his country was completely agreed with the Marxist stand of Mehmet Shehu's speech during the fifth session of the People's Assembly in Albania.⁸¹ Also, about the disagreements with the Soviets, Che Zhui Cin had declared that those existed since Stalin's time and every agreement was violated from the Soviets.⁸²

On the possibility of a stronger cooperation with China, Hoxha was informed since April 1960.⁸³ The aim was to be increased according the ambassador Mihal Prifti the exchanges not only in the field of education and science, but also of professional unions and the cooperative youth.⁸⁴ Primary for the Albanian leadership was the trade question with PRC. The secretary of the PLA's Central Committee, Liri Belishova, in an information of 15 May 1960, instructed to be avoided some flaws from the Trade Ministry in accepting and processing the stocks coming from China.⁸⁵ China could had relations and trade even with former aggressor countries of her as Japan⁸⁶, enough to continue bringing aids and loans to Albania.

On September 1959, Albania in the XIV session of UN's General Assembly, raised again her voice in defense of China's rights in a debate lasting for more than two weeks.⁸⁷ The permanent representative of Albania at UN, Reis Malile, had actively participated in this debate on expelling Taiwan and welcoming PRC in this organization.⁸⁸ In this debate, one of the issues that was strongly presented was that of Tibet which was earlier openly mentioned from the US representative.⁸⁹ The debate on Tibet's issue had started since 20 September 1959, in which the USA asked to be respected the human rights there. Indeed, the debate on Tibet was considered as intrusion on PRC's internal affairs and Albania didn't participated in it and either in the vote to present this case as day order.⁹⁰

The role that Albania could play at China's side in the UN, was simply

81 Ibid, p. 22.

82 Ibid, p. 22/1.

83 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 671, p. 1. Information from Beijing, 15/4/1960.

84 Ibid, p. 2.

85 Ibid, p. 4.

86 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 672, p. 7. Information on China's trade with Japan. Beijing, 18.6.1960.

87 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 681, p. 3. The question of China's representation in the UN. Report of 20 January 1960. Reis Malile, signature.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid, p. 5. On Tibet's question.

90 Ibid, p. 6.

propaganda without any chance of influence in the international politics. The further overall strengthening of relations with the PRC, Albania should keep it through sending time after time cultural delegation as in the case of the writers league on 1960.⁹¹ The ideological approach of literatures between the two countries was another factor which would serve for the reciprocal recognition in the field of literature for both countries.⁹² The fall of 1960 would bring new events where the most important would be the meeting of November between 81 communist and labor parties in Moscow. Would Enver Hoxha have the courage to openly declare himself against Khrushchev's revisionist policies and to pave the way of abandoning the great communist ally where not in few cases he had declared that "without the Soviet Union we cannot survive for a single minute"?⁹³

Moscow's meeting and the deflection of Albania from the Soviet path of socialism

On 29 October 1960 through an order with the inscription "Secret", Enver Hoxha summoned a meeting of the Central Committee on 1 November, about the stand that the PLA delegation should be keeping in the communist parties meeting in Moscow.⁹⁴ The calling of PLA's Central Committee plenum had another goal. In this meeting, was harshly criticized the job of the Agriculture minister, Maqo Çomo.⁹⁵ Having in mind that the agriculture was a very wide sector and main branch of the Albanian economy, the minister Çomo according to the report presented in that plenum, had seen narrowly the problems of agriculture.⁹⁶ In that report, to Maqo Çomo for his mistakes in the management of agriculture sector was addressed a serious critique in December 1959 when were analyzed the outcomes of the quadrennial economic plan.⁹⁷ Based on the report read in the plenum, was manifested the idea that Maqo Çomo had to be relieved from the duty as minister of Agriculture and instead of him to be appointed

91 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 705, p. 1. Information of Shefqet Musarai about the visit of some Albanian writers in China, September-October 1960. Tirana, 30 November 1960.

92 *Ibid*, p. 2.

93 Gjon Boriçi, "Pohimi nga Byroja Politike e PPSH...", op. cit., p. 206. See also *AQSH*, f.14/OU, Y. 1953, F. 32, p. 72. Top Secret. Protocol of the PLA's Central Committee Politbureau meeting on 28-29 September 1953.

94 *AQSH*, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 5, p. 1. Report of PLA's Central Committee prepared by the Politbureau, that would be kept from PLA's delegation chaired from Enver Hoxha in the meeting of communist and labor parties in Moscow on November 1960.

95 *Ibid*, p. 2.

96 *Ibid*.

97 *Ibid*, p. 7.

a cadre with high party spirit.⁹⁸

To show that was very open with party's comrades, before leaving for Moscow, Enver Hoxha read a very detailed report about the stand the Albanian delegation would keep there. The report that Enver Hoxha read in the plenum was long 75 pages and was read from him from the first to the last sentence. According to him, the socialist camp was much more stronger than the capitalist camp.⁹⁹ In this report, Enver Hoxha called glorious the Soviet Union and a decisive factor of the peace triumph in the world.¹⁰⁰ Also, Hoxha didn't left without attacking the Marxism-Leninism traitor, Josip Broz Tito which he accused as the creator of the third force to disorientate the new countries in order to detach them from the natural alliance with the Soviet Union and to relate them with the American imperialism.¹⁰¹

In the other part of the report, tactlessly is attacked Khrushchev's policy, when Hoxha explicitly said that "the exaggerated optimism, not realistic, is not good, but also harmful. Who denies, who diminishes, who has no faith in our great economic, political, military and moral strength, he is a defeatist and doesn't deserves to be called a communist".¹⁰² Enver Hoxha in his speech seemed that his sought opened conflict with the United States of America and the peaceful co-existence that Khrushchev had applied during the second half of the '50ies, didn't suited to the Albanian leader. He wanted the annihilation of the American imperialism.¹⁰³ Nevertheless the disarmament proposals, they according to Hoxha were being systematically sabotaged from the American imperialists.¹⁰⁴ With a word, the Soviet Union wouldn't present anymore proposals about the peace in the world, but had to show its teeth to the US. For Hoxha, not a single principled concession should be made and had to be fought the rampant propaganda that imperialism was instigating against the socialist camp.¹⁰⁵ The peaceful coexistence between two opposite systems according to him, wouldn't mean to give up the class struggle.¹⁰⁶ To this phrase, Hoxha added the opened attack on Khrushchev saying that:

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid, p. 10.

100 Ibid, p. 12.

101 Ibid, p. 14.

102 Ibid, p. 15.

103 Ibid, p. 16.

104 Ibid, p. 17.

105 Ibid, p. 18.

106 Ibid, p. 19.

*“This matter was clear, in vane comrade Khrushchev confused us in the XX Congress and confused it so bad that was likened by the opportunists. Why had to be done all these parodies to the clear Lenin’s thesis and of October Socialist Revolution? The Party of Labor of Albania always had it clear and doesn’t abandons Lenin’s lesson on this matter. Until now no proletariat or communist and labor party has not grasped the power without blood and without violence”.*¹⁰⁷

With this phrases Enver Hoxha wanted to say that the power who has been taken with blood, only with blood could be loosed. In Moscow’s meeting, he would show himself a decisive Stalinist to the end and he wouldn’t apply none of Khrushchev policies. Not only, but he didn’t hesitated to attack the member of the USSR Central Committee, Kozlov (Frol Romanovich), which according to Hoxha had threatened Albania with atomic annihilation.¹⁰⁸ Kozlov’s threat, Hoxha called it as a shameful behavior towards the Albanian people and to the Party of Labor of Albania.¹⁰⁹ The PLA and Albania according to Hoxha wouldn’t be acting to please the wishes of somebody even why were small, because that somebody would be mistaken.¹¹⁰

Even why was attacking Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, Enver Hoxha openly admitted that Albania had no chance to help anybody and nobody needed Albania’s help because was a poor country.¹¹¹ He didn’t denied the big aids and loans his country had received from the socialist camp countries and these aids and credits were used in the best interest of the Albanian people.¹¹² Nevertheless, this aid in his opinion was not to be misused against Albania for anti Marxist purposes.¹¹³ Not only that, but the megalomania of the Albanian leader towards the Soviet Union went so far in the moment he accused the big communist country for hiding the secret of the atomic bomb and hold it responsible for obstructing the other socialist countries for being supplied with nuclear rockets.¹¹⁴ The attack towards the Soviet Union for the monopoly of the nuclear bomb and leaving without it the other socialist countries, the Albanian leader connected it

107 Ibid, p. 20-21.

108 Ibid, p. 22.

109 Ibid, p. 23.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid, p. 24.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid, p. 25.

114 Ibid, p. 28.

with the wrong policy Khrushchev was following against China.¹¹⁵

This was a direct message that in the Sino-Soviet rift, Albania would align at China's side. For Enver Hoxha, was not occasional that the imperialists and their agents were accusing China and Albania as warmongers and allegedly were against the peaceful coexistence.¹¹⁶ In his word, Hoxha didn't left without mentioning the Bucharest meeting where Albania didn't obeyed to the letters of 2 and 7 June 1960 sent by the Soviet Union to attack the Chinese Communist Party.¹¹⁷ According to Hoxha, Khrushchev's aim in Bucharest was to be attacked China and not to be discussed the important international issues.¹¹⁸ During his speech, Enver Hoxha condemned the Bucharest meeting because didn't met the socialist norms, therefore the PLA didn't approved it, and considered it as irregular because were broken the Leninist norms.¹¹⁹ The aim of that meeting according to Hoxha was to be condemned the Chinese Communist Party for an inexistent and baseless guilt.¹²⁰ This conviction, the PLA's Central Committee would defend to the end, said Hoxha.¹²¹ For the Albanian leader, in the Bucharest meeting, Albania was the only country who kept a right stand before the events that took place.¹²² Khrushchev had "blamed" China for a imaginary guilt she had not committed.¹²³

Hoxha went further. He openly accused the Soviet Union that through its ambassador in Tirana, was intensively preparing the attack against the party leadership through army's generals.¹²⁴ With this phrase a new wave of cleansing would occur in the lines of the Albanian army where the most famous name who suffered the ultimate punishment, was the fleet

115 Ibid, p. 29.

116 Ibid, p. 32.

117 Ibid, p. 36.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid, p. 37.

120 Ibid, p. 38.

121 Ibid. Part from Enver Hoxha's speech: "The entire Party of Labor of Albania unanimously thinks that the Soviet comrades have seriously mistaken in Bucharest, they have unjustly condemned the Chinese Communist Party that allegedly they have diverted and abandoned the Moscow declaration of 1957, they have accused the Chinese Communist Party as "dogmatic", "sectarian", that is keen to war, that is against the peaceful coexistence, that prefers a "privileged" position in the camp and in the international communist movement etc. The Soviet comrades are also wrong that profiting from the great love and trust that the communists have for the Soviet Union and for its Communist Party, tried to impose to other communists and labor parties their wrong views towards the Chinese Communist Party".

122 Ibid, p. 40.

123 Ibid, p. 43.

124 Ibid, p. 47.

admiral, Teme Sejko. Also, according to Hoxha, the Soviet ambassador in Tirana had encouraged to raise against the PLA's leadership those people who had studied or continued to study in the Soviet Union.¹²⁵ At the end of his word, Enver Hoxha concluded that nevertheless these attacks against Albania, nobody could ruin the great friendship that existed between his country and the Soviet Union.¹²⁶ He was convinced that the country was to find itself in a big political and economic pressure for a "crime" he has not committed,¹²⁷ but Enver Hoxha hadn't the slightest doubt that the relations of Albania with the Soviet Union were doomed.

The whole material of 75 pages, that Enver Hoxha read in the plenum's meeting on 1 November 1960, was read without omitting a single letter on 16 November in Moscow at the meeting of 81 communist and labor parties kept from 10 November to 1 December 1960.¹²⁸

The disagreement between Tirana and Moscow proved the support of the majority of other parties aligning with Kremlin. Not only, but many conference delegates insulted Albania's leadership. Except the Chinese, all the present delegations condemned Hoxha's speech. Gomulka called the speech repellent¹²⁹ while the hero of the Spanish Civil War, Dolores Ibarruri, stressed that "*Hoxha was like a dog biting the hand that feeds him*".¹³⁰

Enver Hoxha's speech, nevertheless was manifested with big echo from the time Albanian leadership until the collapse of the system, was simply dogmatic and in essence was expressing the fear of losing power. It was a baseless and with no arguments, with exceeded dogmatic thesis, Enver Hoxha's speech closed every path for the future relations of both countries.

Another factor that had encouraged Enver Hoxha to accuse with hard words Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership, were also the disagreements between China and the Soviet Union, a process in which Enver Hoxha aimed to step in frontline by supporting China. November's meeting of 1960, once again showed the polycentrism that was being established in the world communist movement. Moscow and Beijing would continue to be silent enemies and Albania with an unusual step for the diplomacy was aligned with one side of this race. The relations between Albania and the Soviet Union after 1960 would produce extraordinary difficulties for Albania.

125 Ibid, p. 48.

126 Ibid, p. 49.

127 Ibid, p. 52.

128 AQSH, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 27, p. 17. Report on the meeting of Communists and Labor parties representatives (Moscow, November 1960). See also Gjon Boriçi, *Marrëdhëniet shqipëtare-kineze...*, p. 100.

129 Lorenz Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet split ...*, op. cit., p. 189; see also Gjon Boriçi, *Marrëdhëniet shqiptaro-kineze...*, op. cit., p. 102.

130 Ibid, op. cit.

Mikoyan[Anastas] himself would warn Enver Hoxha by mentioning to him the difficulties Albania would face by saying:

*“You’ll see what kind of difficult situations would happen to your Party and people with this turn you are making in the relations with the Soviet Union “.*¹³¹

On 1 December 1960, the newspaper Pravda in Moscow published the news that Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu have left the Soviet capital.¹³² In this historic moment, after the break with the Soviet Union, Enver Hoxha needed protection. Before him laid two alternatives. The most credible was to detach for good from the communist camp and to rely with the West, but this would mean to give up his personal power and to permit country’s liberalization. The second option was China. To heavily rely on Mao’s China as once was related with Stalin’s Soviet Union. This was the most credible alternative for him. Never before between the Albanian people and the Chinese have existed relations and alliances. Nonetheless, Hoxha chose the second option. In his stronghold where he was staying, Enver Hoxha chose China because both countries were united from the communist ideology. And not only that. The economic support that China as a big country would secure to Albania was as much as the first a pragmatic reason.

At China’s hand

After returning from the Soviet Union on 16 December 1960, Enver Hoxha kept a report in the Central Committee about Albania’s [his] stand in Moscow.¹³³ After widely explaining what had happened in the Soviet capital, the focus of the Albanian communist leader turned towards the new savior of his power, the People’s Republic of China. According to Hoxha, recently the relations with the Chinese comrades had become even more close, and this was explained with the fact that both communist parties [Albanian and Chinese], followed one path and were both closely united by the principled road of defending Marxism-Leninism.¹³⁴ According to him, it should be stressed that the PLA didn’t joined CCP or stood by China in an anti Marxist way and not at all acted according to her instructions as Bulgaria’s Zhivkov had tried to present¹³⁵.

131 Enver Hoxha, *Hrushovianët*, Tiranë: 8 Nëntori, 1982, p. 436.

132 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1960, F. 69/BI10, p. 17. Information from Moscow of the Albanian ambassador Nesti Nase.

133 *AQSH*, f. 14/OU, Y. 1960, F. 27, p. 17. Report on the communist and labor parties representatives; on the essential disagreements in the bosom of the international communist and labor movements. Tirana, 16 December 1960.

134 *Ibid*, p. 77.

135 *Ibid*.

During the meeting, Enver Hoxha read to the members of the Central Committee what Deng Xiaoping have said in both his speeches related to PLA which according to him showed the clear Marxist way both Albania and China were following.¹³⁶

Deng Xiaoping speech was enforced from the word kept by the Chinese president Liu Shaoqi in the occasion of concluding the conference to further strengthen the unity among 12 socialist countries, from Albania to Vietnam, from North Korea to East Germany. This was another reply against the Soviets which according to Hoxha threatened to treat Albania as Yugoslavia.¹³⁷ The PLA was grateful to China's sister party for this international and Marxist support.¹³⁸

During and after Moscow's meeting end, the Chinese had advised Hoxha that after the conference proceedings, the Soviet stand towards Albania could be harsh in the future, therefore socially advised the Albanians to be ready for any inconvenience.¹³⁹ The phrase that had tranquillized Hoxha in the meetings with the Chinese in Moscow had been:

"Do not worry at all, because China's Central Committee will help you without hesitation".¹⁴⁰

Also, the Chinese advised Enver Hoxha that especially in the political issues and above all the care he should had in the future on the relations with the Soviets, was to be careful, mature, preserving the principles, but tactically flexible.¹⁴¹ However, to Enver Hoxha didn't interested anymore to improve the relations with Soviet Union's Communist Party. He already had found a new "shelter" which would made possible the preservation of his power. In the Central Committee meeting, he issued the strong directive that PLA in the future should strengthen the relations and the friendship with CCP and the great Chinese people, referring in this directions to Marxism-Leninism lessons and of the line followed until now from party's Central Committee.¹⁴² Hoxha thought that about the contradictions existing between the PLA and Soviet Union's Communist Party both in Bucharest and Moscow meetings to become known to the Albanian people and party's hierarchy.¹⁴³ From the people and workers Enver Hoxha demanded greater

136 Ibid, p. 77-79.

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid, p. 80.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

enthusiasm to succeed.¹⁴⁴

In order to succeed, China had to send everything Albania would require. Also, under the direct watch of Enver Hoxha were specified all the demands addressed to China to sent to Albania. The primal value to be presented to China was 200 million rubles for the first materials and for the machineries 70 million rubles.¹⁴⁵ In defining the materials and of the machineries that Albania would like to demand to People's Republic of China, started from the criteria to generally secure 50% of those materials and machineries, that were necessary for the production and their lack was obstructing country's economy.¹⁴⁶ The other big problem Albania had were the many debts she had received from the Soviet Union and other countries from the socialist camp. For this reason, will be required to China the credit she would grant, Albania would start to liquidate after 1980 until 2000 little by little.¹⁴⁷

The loan Albania was asking from China for the third quinquennial was 690 million rubles.¹⁴⁸ Replacing with a finger clap the great and steel love towards the Soviet Union with the People's Republic of China, Enver Hoxha at the end of 1960 and exactly on 31 December, in the end year report, issued the call [the order] to faithfully continue preserving the Marxism-Leninism principles.¹⁴⁹ The PLA according to Hoxha, disagreed on the way of critic against Stalin's cult.¹⁵⁰ This indeed, was the true reason of the irreparable cut of the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania starting with the XX Congress of Soviet Union's Communist Party. The Soviet leadership according to Hoxha would continue to be in contradiction even with the principles of Moscow Declaration of 1957.¹⁵¹ Albania had become hostile with the Soviet Union because according to Hoxha, Albania continued to genuinely defend the Marxist-Leninist path and didn't fell prey to the economic pressures.¹⁵² Albania would continue to walk in the socialism and

144 Ibid, p. 81.

145 Ibid, p. 82. "Prefix on the demands we have to present to the People's Republic of China for materials and machineries for 1961 and also for the complete works during the III Quinquennial 1961-1965".

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid, p. 86.

148 Ibid, p. 101. Index nr. 6.

149 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1960, F. 505, p. 43/1. Part from Enver Hoxha's call: "From this we have to draw the conclusion: to faithfully preserve the Marxism-Leninism principles, the political and ideological principles, which compound the essential line of our party, because only like this we would avert the principled mistakes".

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid, p. 45/1.

152 Ibid, p. 48.

communism path¹⁵³ and this road was the only one which would secure him the preservation of the power. What preserved his power until the end of his life was simple the Soviet-Chinese break. The Albanian people had “the great fortune” to unwavering walk in the social-communism path led without hesitation by Enver Hoxha.

Conclusions

The second half of the '50ies of the XX century, found the People's Republic of Albania very poor and full of debts towards the socialist camp countries chaired by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the credits and loans the country had received, never had essential economic raise and always continued to be dependent from the economic “mercy” of the socialist countries. Hundreds of millions of rubles which at that time was equal to the US dollar, were invested to Albania to build from the foundations a very backwarded country and not at all politically responsible about the seriousness it had to show in the economic relations with the socialist camp countries. So much credits and loans which were unbearable for the Albanian people. Every socialist camp country sent to Albania big amount of loans during all the '50ies in a country of no more than 1.3 million inhabitants, and still the economy was not improving. Only for the time space 1954-1960, Albania has received from the Europe's socialist countries credits and loans in the measure of 1.616.485.075.14 rubles.* If we could make a comparison with the Western European countries who received credits from the United States of America in the framework of the Marshall Plan,¹⁵⁴ Albania should overcome by many times with economic growth if all these money would have been properly invested.

153 Ibid, p. 56/1.

* This question is widely explained in my new book "Fillimet e marrëdhënieve politiko-ekonomike shqiptaro-kineze, 1954-1960/The beginnings of the Albanian-Chinese political economic relations, 1954-1960 ", off-print.

154 Gjon Boriçi, “Western Europe or China? An economic interest assessment why was Western Europe saved from communism by George Marshall at the beginning of the Cold War, 1945-1949, whereas Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalists were abandoned and left in the hands of Mao Zedong's communists?”, op. cit., in *The role of money in wartime, Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania*, Tirana, 20 September 2018, Tirana: Bank of Albania, 2019, p. 165. “The countries who profited the most were Great Britain with \$3.2 billion (today \$32 billion), France \$2.7 billion (today \$27 billion), Italy \$1.5 billion (today \$15 billion) and West Germany \$1.4 billion (today \$14 billion)”; see also Gjon Boriçi, “Varësia e mbijetesës ekonomike të Shqipërisë nga ndihmat dhe kreditë e kampit socialist dhe të Republikës Popullore të Kinës 1956-1962”, in *Studime historike* 1/2, 2020, p. 213-234.